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THE SOUTH AFRIC AN NAV Y AND AFRIC AN
MARITIME SECURIT Y
Deane-Peter Baker

T

he onset of pirate attacks on merchant vessels off the Horn of Africa in recent years has put Africa’s maritime security increasingly in the international
spotlight. Recent times have also seen the advent of the African Union and with
it a commitment to “African solutions to African problems.” Despite this, African
states have made little active contribution to securing Africa’s maritime domains.
Yet, as the scholar and analyst Augustus Vogel, of the Africa Center for Strategic
Studies in Washington, D.C., points out, doing so
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is vitally important to Africa: illegal fishing undercuts
Africa’s economic development and exacerbates its food
security challenges; piracy makes badly needed trade and
investment in Africa more risky and expensive; the continent is becoming an increasingly active drug trafficking
hub; the growing drug trade, in turn, is giving international criminal syndicates a foothold within certain
African governments, weakening their ability to address
other national priorities; and illegal commerce (such as
oil bunkering, transport of counterfeit materials, and
theft) impacts legitimate businesses and world markets.
In short, many of Africa’s emerging threats arrive by sea.1

Most glaring has been the lack of a significant contribution by the South African Navy (SAN), arguably
sub-Saharan Africa’s most capable naval force. This article begins with a brief outline of the history of South
Africa’s navy—a history that accounts for some of the
1
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contemporary navy’s shortcomings. The article then outlines the SAN’s current
capabilities and addresses the current constraints it faces. The article closes by
looking to the future and advocating steps and measures that will need to be
taken if the South African Navy is to make a significant contribution to African,
or indeed even South African, maritime security.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY
To grasp fully what we might call the “philosophical” factors that limit the effectiveness of today’s South African Navy, it is helpful to have a sense of the history
of this force. The first officially recognized naval unit formed in South Africa was
raised in 1885 in what was then the Natal Colony, as a consequence of a perceived
threat emerging from tensions between Britain and Russia over Afghanistan.
Technically a coastal artillery force, this unit, the Natal Naval Volunteers, never
took part in a maritime engagement. It did, however, serve with some distinction
as part of the British forces engaged in the second Anglo-Boer War, and again
during the Zulu rebellion of 1906.2
In 1905 the Cape Colonial government followed the lead of the Natal Colony
by establishing a branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), commonly known as the Cape Naval Volunteers.3 With the 1910 formation of the
Union of South Africa in the aftermath of the second Anglo-Boer War, this system of naval volunteers was extended to include the whole of the Union, through
the formation in 1912 of the South African Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer
Reserve (RNVR[SA]), under the command of the Royal Navy.4 Mobilized for service in World War I, the RNVR(SA) contributed twelve officers and 267 sailors,
who between them served in every theater of the war.5
The experience of the First World War convinced the Union government of
the need for a full-time naval capability, and in 1922 the South African Naval
Service (SANS) was established to complement the capability provided by the
volunteers of the RNVR(SA). The advent of the SANS brought with it South
Africa’s first naval vessels—a survey vessel and two minesweeping trawlers on
loan from the Royal Navy. The recommissioning of these vessels under the prefix
HMSAS (His [or Her] Majesty’s South African Ship) on 1 April 1922 is marked
as the South African Navy’s birthday.6
Despite this promising start, things quickly went badly for the fledgling SANS.
The global effects of the Great Depression led to severe budget cuts. By 1934
all three of the SANS’s vessels had been returned to the Royal Navy, and by the
time of the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 it “had virtually ceased
to exist.”7 The pressing demands of the war stimulated the Union government to
relaunch its full-time naval capability under a new name, the South African Seaward Defence Force (SDF).8 The service experienced rapid growth, and by 1945
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/9
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the authorized personnel establishment “had grown to more than 10,000 officers
and ratings, with some 89 assorted vessels [all converted commercial vessels]
in commission.”9 SDF vessels did duty in the South African and Mediterranean
theaters. In addition, as in the First World War, the volunteers of the RNVR(SA)
provided manpower to the Royal Navy, with members eventually serving in every maritime theater of the war. South Africa’s navy was once again renamed in
1942, this time as the South African Naval Forces, and in 1944 it received its first
genuine warships, in the form of three Loch-class antisubmarine frigates. (One of
these vessels, HMSAS Natal, performed a remarkable, probably unique feat: only
hours after leaving the builder’s yard and en route to workup training, it located
and sank a German submarine, U-714.)10
In the aftermath of the Second World War the navy underwent its final name
change, becoming known in 1951 as simply the South African Navy.11 What followed was a period of expansion that is generally considered to have been the
navy’s heyday. Between 1957 and 1962 the SAN received six blue-water-capable
vessels—a Type 15 frigate, two W-class destroyers, and three Type 12 frigates—all
purchased from Britain under the terms of the Simon’s Town Agreement.12 The
addition of a squadron of Avro Shackleton long-range maritime patrol aircraft
and a squadron of Blackburn (later Hawker Siddeley) Buccaneer maritime strike
aircraft to the inventory of the South African Air Force (SAAF), as well as Westland Wasp shipboard antisubmarine helicopters, added significantly to South
Africa’s ability to patrol and secure its maritime environment. The purchase of
the Danish tanker Annam in 1967 and its subsequent conversion into the underway replenishment vessel SAS Tafelberg gave the SAN the ability to conduct longduration and long-range missions. The additional acquisition of three Daphnéclass submarines from France during the late 1960s and early 1970s rounded out
the SAN as a small but capable and well-balanced navy, optimized for operations
against other naval forces.13
The Afrikaner nationalist government that ruled South Africa from 1948 until
the end of the apartheid era in 1994 harbored a deep hostility toward Britain, as
a consequence of that nation’s colonial history in South Africa. Despite this, and
because of the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union, from the end of the
Second World War until the mid-1970s it seemed virtually axiomatic that South
Africa would side with Britain and the West in any future war against the Soviet
bloc, serving as “the vigilant ‘Guardian of the Cape Sea Route.’”14 For this reason,
in light of the close historical ties between the South African Navy and the Royal
Navy, “the SA Navy was perceived by many of the senior officers in both navies as
simply an extension of, and in all but name and administrative function, an operational section of the Royal Navy.”15 However, the South African government’s
policy of apartheid led to British withdrawal from the Simon’s Town Agreement
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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in 1975, thereby ending the historical close ties between the South African and
Royal Navies.16
By the latter part of the 1970s South Africa was facing increasing international
isolation as well as the heavy budgetary demands imposed by its counterinsurgency campaign in South West Africa (now Namibia) and its involvement in civil
war in Angola and warfare in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). This isolation and the
imposition of a mandatory United Nations (UN) arms embargo made it increasingly unlikely that the SAN would be called on by the West to play a role in countering the Soviet navy. As a result, in February 1977 the leadership of the South
African Defence Force (SADF) effectively reduced the role of the SAN to that
of a coastal force.17 The planned acquisition of two Type A69 corvettes and two
Agosta-class submarines from France was canceled. A project to acquire Reshefclass missile strike craft from Israel did, however, go ahead, with a final tally of
nine entering into service, three built in Israel and six in Durban.18 The strike
craft, armed with between six and eight Scorpion surface-to-surface missiles
(SSMs) and two OTO Melara 76/60 mm compact dual-purpose guns, entered
service between July 1977 and July 1986.19 By the latter date the last remaining
frigates that had entered service with the SAN in the late 1950s and early 1960s
had been withdrawn from service;20 the strike craft were left as the backbone of
South Africa’s coastal navy of the 1980s and 1990s.
Struggling under a much-reduced budget, by the end of the 1970s the SAN
had nonetheless found a niche that enabled it to maintain its relevance. The
strike craft were used on a regular basis to insert and recover special forces teams
behind enemy lines, and “for some of the more distant and covert operations the
Navy demonstrated how rapidly and how effectively it had mastered the complex
and difficult task of operating submarines by using them to insert small numbers
of men and then recover them on completion of their task.”21 More traditional
naval tasks were also carried out. It was proclaimed by one observer in 1985 that
“Soviet naval movements in the region are shadowed routinely . . . [mainly by]
the submarines. Apparently they [South African submarines] have grown quite
adept at [these operations], not least vis-à-vis other submarines.”22
Apart from the purchase of four small, locally built minehunters in the early
1980s, the only major naval acquisition of that period was the domestically designed and constructed six-thousand-ton (12,500 tons full load) support vessel
SAS Drakensburg, which was commissioned in 1987. Three years prior to that,
the navy’s other support vessel, the ageing SAS Tafelberg, had completed a refit
“that allowed her to carry a company-strength landing force, two medium helicopters and six small landing craft as well as the addition of a small hospital. This
provided the SA Navy with a limited amphibious support capability.”23 This was,
in all likelihood, an attempt to afford additional maneuver capability to SADF
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/9
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commanders conducting cross-border operations against the South West Africa
People’s Organization (SWAPO) and the supporting People’s Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Cuban forces in Angola. This amphibious
capability was, however, never used operationally, and SAS Tafelberg was decommissioned in 1993.24
The period of South Africa’s transition to democracy (from 1990 to 1994) was
a particularly painful one for the South African Navy. Massive cuts to the defense
budget forced the SAN to cut its personnel complement by 23 percent, with effect
from the SAN’s sixty-eighth birthday, 1 April 1990. Another consequence of the
cut was the cancellation of a long-running and fairly advanced program to build
submarines in South Africa. The one positive development of this period was
the purchase in February 1993 of Juvent, originally built as an icebreaking Arctic
supply vessel for the Soviet navy. Renamed SAS Outeniqua, this vessel replaced
the decommissioned Tafelberg and proved particularly useful in supporting the
South African research base in Antarctica. The capability represented by this vessel was, however, lost to the SAN in 2005, when Outeniqua was sold back into the
private sector as a cost-cutting measure.25
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY TODAY: CAPABILITIES
With the fall of the apartheid regime, the African National Congress (ANC),
under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, came to power in South Africa’s first
democratic elections in 1994 and has remained in power since. The South African Navy inherited by the new government was in a poor state. The personnel
cuts instigated in 1990 had affected both morale and capability, and operational
capability amounted primarily to two support vessels (reduced to one in 2005),
a handful of small ageing strike craft optimized for the more peaceful waters of
the Mediterranean, and three diesel-electric submarines rapidly reaching the
ends of their useful service lives (all three Daphnés would be decommissioned by
2003).26 There was considerable concern that the SAN might not survive at all in
any useful form. Given the very pressing socioeconomic needs that had to be addressed by the new government and the fact that South Africa was now at peace
with its neighbors and facing no discernible military threat, many believed that
the South African military would be significantly reduced in size and capability,
possibly even disbanded altogether.
Thankfully for the SAN, this did not happen. Rather than “disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate” the apartheid-era South African Defence Force, its proxies,
and the armed wings of the liberation movements, the new government instead
integrated them into a new national military force, the South African National
Defence Force (SANDF).27 The ANC government also launched an ambitious
and controversial Strategic Defence Procurement (SDP) package, announced in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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September 1999, which focused on purchasing new ships for the navy and new
aircraft for the air force.28 Under the terms of the SDP the navy has since received
four MEKO A200SAN frigates, three Type 209/1400 submarines (SSKs), and four
Westland Super Lynx maritime helicopters.29
The frigates, designated as the Valour class in SAN service and displacing 3,590
tons, combine a modular architecture with an X-form superstructure that very
effectively reduces radar signature. Propelled by two MTU sixteen-cylinder, Vconfiguration 1163 TB 93 diesel engines and a fully independent “combined diesel and gas turbine–waterjet and refined propellers” (CODAG-WARP) propulsion system, these vessels have a sustained speed of twenty knots, with a cruising
range of eight thousand nautical miles, and they are capable of over twenty-eight
knots. Primary armament consists of eight MM40 Block 2 Exocet SSMs and one
OTO Melara 76/62 mm compact dual-purpose gun. Air defense is secured by
sixteen vertically launched, locally developed Umkhonto surface-to-air missiles
(plus sixteen reloads), missiles that can engage multiple targets at ranges in excess
of twelve kilometers. Secondary weapons include one twin 35 mm gun, two 20
mm guns, and two 12.7 mm machine guns. Antisubmarine warfare capability is
provided by hull-mounted sonar and an embarked Super Lynx Mk 64 helicopter.
(Each ship can accommodate two medium helicopters, though normally only
one will be deployed.)30
The Type 209/1400 submarines displace 1,454 tons dived and are capable of
a dived speed of 21.5 knots (ten knots surfaced). They can dive 250 meters and
can cruise up to fifty days without replenishment. Primary armament comprises
eight twenty-one-inch torpedo tubes that can be reloaded under way (and, if necessary, submerged) from a store of an additional six torpedoes. Four of the tubes
are also capable of minelaying, and the South African Type 209s have been modified from the standard design to give them the ability to support special forces.
In addition to the new frigates and submarines, the SAN of today is rounded
out by a number of legacy vessels. Chief among these is the support vessel Drakensburg. Two of the original nine Warrior-class strike craft remain operational,
now with their SSMs removed and redesignated as offshore patrol vessels.31
Three small T-Craft inshore patrol boats of glass-reinforced-plastic sandwich
construction, ordered in 1991, were commissioned in 2003. The unarmed SAS
Protea, commissioned in 1971, undertakes hydrographic survey duties, and the
SAN also operates two small minehunters, a number of locally built Namacurra
harbor patrol boats, and three tugs.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY TODAY: CONSTRAINTS
On paper, at least, the South African Navy is the most capable naval force in
sub-Saharan Africa. Despite this, barring a handful of fishery protection and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/9
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antismuggling operations conducted in home waters and the occasional sea
rescue operation, the SAN has made little apparent contribution to African
maritime security.32 Yet securing the maritime domain must be considered to be
among Africa’s more significant challenges.
The SAN’s relative inactivity in this regard is somewhat surprising, given the
leading role South Africa has taken on itself in addressing security challenges
across the continent over the past fifteen years. Since being welcomed back into
the international fold and shedding its pariah status, South Africa has played a
leading role in addressing conflict and defusing tensions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, and São Tome and Principe, and it
has contributed additional forces to African Union (AU) and UN missions in the
Comoros, Darfur, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia. Under the leadership of former
president Thabo Mbeki (Mandela’s successor), South Africa was also one of the
driving forces behind the creation of the AU out of the ashes of the largely irrelevant Organization of African Unity. In recent times the AU has increasingly
acknowledged the importance of maritime security. Despite all this, until recently
the only direct use of South Africa’s naval capability in support of African security was the deployment of a flotilla of three Namacurra harbor patrol boats
(increasing to five in 2005) to the Burundian section of Lake Tanganyika between
2003 and 2007, as part of the AU and subsequent UN peacekeeping forces in
Burundi.33
One notable operational contribution by South Africa to maritime security in
recent times, however, involved the Southern African Joint Surveillance Patrols.34
For one month, March 2009, officials from Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa,
and Tanzania conducted joint patrols on board the South African offshore patrol
vessel Sarah Baartman. During the operation forty-one vessels were inspected,
ten of which were fined; a further six were arrested for violations of national
maritime laws. One of the seized vessels, detained in Tanzanian waters, had on
board over three hundred tons of illegal tuna. While this cooperative venture was
an important step in the right direction, it must be noted that it did not involve
South African Navy assets but rather an environmental-protection ship from the
Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries.
An important recent exception to the SAN’s disengaged status quo has been
the commencement of antipiracy patrols in the Mozambique Channel. According to comments by Lindiwe Sisulu, South Africa’s Minister of Defence and
Military Veterans, the first informal steps in launching these patrols were taken
in response to an attack by Somali pirates on a Mozambican vessel in “the waters
of SADC [Southern African Development Community] around the 28th of December,” in 2010.35 Although information is somewhat scarce, calls for assistance
by the Mozambican government and that of Tanzania seem to have led to the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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formalization of these patrols. The patrols involve a single frigate on station at
any one time, apparently “carrying a contingent of Special Forces and Maritime
Reaction Squadron (MRS) commandos to conduct boarding operations.”36 An
unconfirmed report suggests that additional support is being provided by landbased aircraft launched from a strip at the popular diving resort of Pemba, in
northern Mozambique.37
Though antipiracy patrols in the Mozambique Channel by the SAN must be
seen as encouraging, this seems to be largely a symbolic and ad hoc arrangement,
and there are questions as to whether it can be sustained. It must, therefore, be
conceded that thus far the SAN’s contribution to African maritime security has
been very limited indeed. What, exactly, explains the lack of impact of this seemingly capable naval force? The answer is a combination of a mismatch between
the assets the navy has available and the security challenges it needs to combat,
budget constraints, and a lack of political will.
The Capability/Challenge Mismatch
As its brief history as given above illustrates, the South African Navy has traditionally played the role of “Guardian of the Cape Sea Route,” first in service of
Great Britain in the First and Second World Wars and later as a perceived part
of the “West,” in response to the threat posed by the naval forces of the Soviet
Union. This history is relevant today because of the impact it has had on the
SAN’s perception of its own role and function. First and foremost, the SAN of
today is conceived of and equipped as a “counternavy” force. That is to say, it is
structured and equipped to give South Africa the ability to engage in battle with
an as-yet-undefined enemy naval force.
This is clearly evident when one considers its primary assets—stealth frigates, armed primarily with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, and
torpedo-armed diesel-electric submarines. One can easily see in these acquisitions a harking back to the service’s “golden era” of the 1960s and early 1970s.
Yet it is plain that the likelihood of the SAN engaging enemy surface combatants,
maritime strike aircraft, or submarines in the Cape sea-lanes is extremely remote
indeed. While the frigates do have a certain general-purpose utility beyond their
conventional war-fighting capabilities, that same utility could most certainly
have been achieved with cheaper vessels. Also, one has to wonder at the usefulness
of the SAN’s submarine force: only three ships have been sunk by submarinefired torpedoes in the sixty-six years since the end of the Second World War.38 The
submarines do obviously have some value in their ability to conduct surveillance
operations and support special forces, but this hardly seems to justify the expense
of these demanding and sophisticated vessels.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/9
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As Vogel points out, this misalignment of operational philosophy, structure,
and equipment with the actual threats being faced is a common one in the African context:
Of the 33 independent maritime nations in sub-Saharan Africa, only five—Cape
Verde, Liberia (when legislation is finalized), São Tome and Principe, the Republic
of Mauritius, and the Republic of Seychelles—have maritime forces that identify
themselves as coast guards rather than navies. Yet Africa’s maritime security challenges are most often comprised of threats such as illegal fishing, narcotrafficking, and
maritime disaster response—threats requiring the technical skills and collaborative
relationships with civilian organizations typical of a coast guard.39

Given that the most pressing maritime threats facing South Africa and the continent as a whole are in fact illegal fishing, piracy, drug trafficking, and illegal
commerce, the most glaring gap in the SAN’s current capabilities is the lack of a
genuine inshore/offshore patrol capability.40 The frigates can be used for offshore
patrol, but as Minister Sisulu recently commented, “some of our frigates are too
big to move around the coast.”41 The two remaining operational Warrior-class
strike craft, though redesignated as offshore patrol vessels, are of limited utility,
having reached the end of their effective service lives. The three T-Craft inshore
patrol vessels have inadequate range and often struggle in the rough seas off
South Africa’s coast. The SAN shares responsibility for patrolling its waters with
the Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (which operates Sarah
Baartman and three Lilian Ngoyi–class inshore patrol vessels) and the South
African Police Service (or SAPS, operating a handful of small boats), but even
this collective capability falls well short of what is necessary to patrol effectively
South Africa’s territorial waters and its vast (1,553,000 square kilometers) exclusive economic zone (EEZ).42
Exacerbating the situation is a much-eroded South African Air Force maritime
patrol capability. Since the retirement in 1984 of the venerable Avro Shackletons
and, in 1993, of the smaller P166S Albatross maritime patrol aircraft purchased
in the late 1960s, the SAAF has relied for maritime patrol primarily on five ancient, though upgraded, Second World War–era Douglas C-47TP Turbo Dakotas
(referred to affectionately as the “TurboDaks” or as “Dakletons,” in reference to
the Shackletons they replaced).43 Even setting aside their frailty, these senior citizens of the air lack the necessary range to cover the far reaches of South Africa’s
maritime area of responsibility. As one analyst points out,
In September 1996 the South African Air Force flew its last long range patrol to the
South African owned Prince Edward Island group in the South Atlantic. The aircraft
that undertook this flight, a Boeing 707, has since been retired from service because

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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of a lack of funding to maintain it. Since that time it is estimated that nearly a million
tonnes of Patagonian toothfish have been illegally harvested from the area because of
a lack of military control over the area by the South African Government, resulting in
a substantial financial loss to South Africa.44

The air force’s Buccaneer maritime strike aircraft once offered a secondary
maritime patrol capability, but they have been discarded and not replaced. There
is no evidence that the SAAF plans to employ its new light, multirole SAAP
Gripen fighters in this role; given their relatively short range, these aircraft are not
particularly suited for maritime patrol, even as a secondary function. Some capability is provided by the SAAF’s Cessna C208 Caravan light turboprop aircraft,
for which three sets of Argos 410-Z airborne observation systems were purchased
in 2007.45 However these aircraft, along with the “Dakletons,” are scheduled for
retirement in 2015, with no certain replacements on the horizon.
Budget Constraints
The creation of the South African National Defence Force in 1994 was, in domestic political terms, a considerable success. While there were inevitable tensions
among former enemies, the process was achieved relatively smoothly, and significant follow-on hostilities were averted. In purely military terms, however, the
SANDF has been less successful. Perhaps inevitably, the impressive war-fighting
capability that it inherited from its primary predecessor, the apartheid-era SADF,
has been eroded by such factors as the higher priority accorded to the ten-year
process of integrating the various former apartheid-era forces into one national
defense organization; downsizing of the SANDF (particularly the army) and the
slow pace at which it is proceeding; the increasing obsolescence of military equipment (despite big-ticket purchases for the air force and navy under the Strategic
Defence Procurement package); and severe budgetary constraints in the face
of pressing national social and health problems, especially a high rate of HIV/
AIDS. In addition, the SANDF, particularly the army, has faced an unexpectedly
high operational tempo in its contributions to peacekeeping missions across the
African continent.
All of this has meant that, as has often been the case in its eighty-eight-year
history, the SAN currently finds itself low on the budgetary priority list. Defense
expenditure in South Africa is a mere 1.3 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP);46 this amounts to a paltry ZAR 30.4 billion (about U.S.$4.4 billion) for
the 2010–11 financial year.47 Approximately 7 percent of the defense budget is allocated to the navy’s operational budget, around ZAR 2.1 billion (about U.S.$308
million). In a briefing to South Africa’s parliament in March 2010, a Department
of Defence spokesperson announced that this budget meant that in 2010–11 the
SAN would be able to spend only ten thousand hours on patrol at sea. According

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/9
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to a media account of the briefing, “in 2012 and 2013 this would be cut . . . to just
9000 hours. Divided between the operational fleet [not including inshore patrol
vessels or support vessels,] . . . this translates to just over 41 days per ship for the
financial year . . . ; or about one ship or submarine patrolling SA’s 71,460 square
km territorial waters on any given day. Each ship will spend about 324 days in
port.”48
Lack of Political Will
Limitations in budget and capability, while obviously important, do not alone explain why the South African Navy has not contributed to such maritime security
efforts as the multinational effort to combat piracy in the waters off the Horn of
Africa. In a briefing to Parliament’s Defence Portfolio Committee in November
2010, Rear Admiral Bernhard Teuteberg (SAN Director Maritime Strategy)
stated that the SAN is capable of mounting antipiracy operations off the coast of
Somalia (though he warned that this would be difficult to sustain for more than
six months and that even a short deployment would have “implications”).49 To
paraphrase an old saying, where there is political will, there is a way. For example,
“in December 2004, SAS Drakensberg deployed to Haiti with SA Police Service,
SA Special Forces, SA Air Force and SA Military Health Service assets to provide
logistic support and protection for the South African and Haitian Presidents
during the . . . island’s 200th Anniversary of its independence.”50 That round-trip
journey of over twelve thousand miles illustrates the South African government’s
willingness to order significant naval operations when it deems necessary. So
what accounts for South Africa’s lack of willingness to employ its naval assets for
significant maritime security operations, particularly beyond its home waters?
One possible contributing factor for South Africa’s reluctance to contribute
to antipiracy efforts is that it has virtually no merchant fleet (the only vessel on
the commercial register, SA Oranje, will soon be retired). Political rhetoric aside,
therefore, policy makers may have felt that South Africa has little vested interest
in antipiracy operations in international waters. This view would unquestionably
ignore the broader impacts of piracy on trade affecting the South African economy.51 (The newly commenced antipiracy patrols in the Mozambique Channel,
as well as other developments I will discuss below, suggest that this perception
that “piracy is not our business” is now starting to change.) Another factor in the
short and medium terms has been the continuing effects of South Africa’s focus
on the FIFA World Cup, which ran to its completion in mid-July 2010. Preparations for the World Cup included large-scale government investment in public
works, from new and upgraded stadia to public transport infrastructure, at an
estimated cost of U.S.$3.5 billion.52 This included a very significant investment
in security, with the SAN playing its part in Operation KGWELE (the SANDF
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World Cup security mission) by deploying three of its Valour-class frigates off
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and Durban in support of army special forces and
the navy’s own MRS. The frigates also provided radar feed to assist the air force
in securing the skies over the World Cup venues against a 9/11-style attack. Two
submarines were also sent on patrol, and a number of other vessels were deployed
as support platforms.53 This operation, while apparently successful, absorbed
considerable resources, leaving the SAN, already suffering under the budget constraints outlined above, somewhat anemic.
Perhaps more significant is the fact that recent defense decisions under South
Africa’s current president, Jacob Zuma, suggest a shift in policy. Under his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, South Africa’s foreign policy was driven by the notion
of an emerging “African Renaissance,” to be made possible in part by a vigorous
commitment to peace and stability operations on the continent. President Zuma
was elected to the leadership of the ruling ANC in an acrimonious contest with
then-president Mbeki in 2007 (thereby effectively reducing Mbeki to lame-duck
status), largely riding on a wave of dissatisfaction over Mbeki’s perceived lack of
focus on domestic issues. Zuma was elected president in 2009, and since then
South Africa has maintained its existing peacekeeping and related commitments
but has notably taken on no significant additional external missions. This is
particularly noteworthy in that June 2009 marked the end of the SANDF’s tenyear deployment to Burundi.54 That effectively reduced the number of externally
deployed troops by around a third.55 The Zuma administration has preferred to
commit troops to secure South Africa’s borders, reversing a decision made under
Mbeki to turn over border security entirely to the SAPS. Currently it is planned
that under Operation CORONA over 3,600 SANDF troops, a significant proportion of the South African Army’s deployable manpower, will be on South Africa’s
borders by 2014.56 Taken together, these factors suggest that South African national policy is shifting away from expeditionary engagements involving military
forces and focusing more on domestic priorities.
INTO THE FUTURE
Despite the many negatives outlined in this article, there have in recent times
been signs of movement in the right direction. One has been the emergence of a
new, as yet unpublished, maritime security strategy. While the value of this strategy will obviously depend on its content, the fact that maritime security has received high-level attention is itself encouraging. Comments made in Parliament
relating to the content of the strategy also give reasons for hope. For example,
Minister Sisulu indicated in response to a question posed by a member that there
are plans afoot to cover all of South Africa’s EEZ with “some form of sensor, or
combination of sensors that will produce the most optimal coverage.”57
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Another potentially positive development is the possible revival of Project
BIRO, a program to replace the SAN’s ageing and limited inshore and offshore patrol capability. By Minister Sisulu’s admission, BIRO had been “shelved,” but a recent media report indicates that the Simon’s Town–based Institute for Maritime
Technology has been issued a “request for quotation” by the SAN for “strategic
technology and engineering support services during the project study phase of
the acquisition of a multi-mission patrol capability.” Furthermore, “the Estimates
of National Expenditure (ENE) tabled by Minister of Finance Pravin Gordhan in
February noted that the National Treasury will fund the acquisition of new ships
for the Navy from the 2013/14 financial year,” specifically “the replacement of the
offshore and inshore patrol vessels, procurement of new harbour tugs and the
replacement of small boats.”58
Further potentially good news concerns Project SAUCEPAN, the South African
Air Force’s program to replace its almost septuagenarian Douglas C47 Dakota
maritime surveillance aircraft. In the words of the chief of the SAAF, Lieutenant
General Carlo Gagiano, SAUCEPAN has been “pulled to the left”—that is, pushed
higher on the agenda—by the arrival of piracy in southern African waters and is
now considered “urgent and important.”59
While these are certainly encouraging signs, they do not necessarily indicate
that South Africa is moving toward a comprehensive and well designed approach
to ensuring its own maritime security and contributing to that of other African
nations. For one thing, there is every chance that these developments will founder
on the rock of budgetary constraint. Perhaps even more importantly, there are
worrisome indicators that the new maritime security strategy is an ad hoc, kneejerk reaction to the fact that piracy has finally reached SADC waters.60 While piracy is one of the things the SAN must be capable of addressing, it is by no means
the only, or even the main, security threat that must be considered.
Ultimately what is needed is a broad and comprehensive rethinking of South
Africa’s approach to securing its borders, people, and interests. A recalibration
of this kind will have to be realistic about the level of defense expenditure South
Africa can afford (given the pressing social challenges that must be addressed
by the government on a very small tax base) and must be set against a realistic
assessment of the threat environment that South Africa is likely to face.61 These
considerations together will likely point to a reduction of South Africa’s ability to
contribute to peace and stability operations on the ground in far-flung parts of
Africa (as mentioned above, this reduction seems already to have begun, under
the current administration’s policy priorities), but this must be weighed against
the impact that a more stable and economically successful South Africa will have
on the southern African region in the long term.
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As I have argued elsewhere, South Africa should focus to a considerable
degree on engagement with neighboring countries, with the goal of ensuring
their viability as secure and prosperous democratic states.62 The primary tools
in achieving this goal will be economic, legal, and diplomatic. The SANDF and
other security organs of the state will have roles to play as well, through such
activities as offering training and assistance and sharing intelligence. The tools
of so-called developmental peacekeeping will be critical here, though employed
preemptively rather than only when an emergency arises that requires the deployment of a traditional peacekeeping or peace-enforcement mission.63 From
another perspective, this approach is what one counterinsurgency expert has
called “anti-insurgency.”64
Critical in this approach is, first, the fact that it could potentially have a far
greater impact on African security in the long term than the current “firefighting”
model (in which South African efforts go primarily toward addressing conflicts
that have already broken out). Second, though self-interested, this approach does
not represent a shirking of South Africa’s international responsibilities. For as
South Africa’s neighbors grow in prosperity and security they will develop both
the desire and the capability to sustain that success by seeking the security and
prosperity of their own neighbors. What should ideally emerge is something like
the “ink-spot theory” of counterinsurgency, in which “spots” or areas of security
and stability spread and eventually merge with other zones of security and stability, just as drops of ink coalesce on paper.65
Like those of most African nations, South Africa’s military has historically
been, and is currently, “army heavy,” most of its budget and capabilities invested
in (largely conventional) land forces. A reconceptualized force would undoubtedly better serve South Africa’s interests. Given that a conventional military threat
emerging from one of South Africa’s neighbors or any combination thereof is
extremely unlikely, even more so from a power outside the region, South Africa should redirect a significant proportion of its current military expenditure
toward the formation of a gendarmerie-style border guard (with a secondary
counterinsurgency capability) and the development of a significant coast guard
—what, together, I call “Shield forces.”66 The remainder of the SANDF should be
converted into a small but well trained and well equipped joint expeditionary
formation—a “Spear force.”
Under this “high-low” model, the SAN would have two primary functions—
namely, providing a coast guard–style Shield capability as well as assets to enable and support Spear forces. For the Shield capability, “coverage” will be more
important than “clout.” Airborne surveillance assets, such as maritime patrol
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, will be vital for situational awareness of
the nation’s vast EEZ. An adequate number of naval platforms, split between
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/9
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inshore and offshore patrol vessels, will be required to take advantage of the
situational awareness these aerial surveillance assets provide. Significantly more
platforms than are currently in the SAN inventory will be necessary to ensure that
the nation’s EEZ is adequately patrolled. Here the navy’s 2030 forward-planning
process, as articulated in November 2010 by its Chief Director Maritime Strategy,
Rear Admiral Bernhard Teuteberg, seems to point in the right direction, proposing adding three inshore patrol vessels to the currently mandated force structure
—an increase of 100 percent.67 Funding indications from the government, however, suggest an inclination toward maintenance of the status quo, replacing, but
not adding to, the current patrol vessels.68
Expeditionary (Spear) missions would in all likelihood primarily engage land
targets, but naval forces nonetheless would have a critical role to play, particularly given the fact that 70 percent of African states are littoral. Recent examples
abound of operations of kinds likely to be undertaken. In the first three months
of 2011 alone the SANDF stood up forces for one actual and two potential noncombatant evacuation operations, in South Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and Libya.
Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire led in January to SAS Drakensburg’s being diverted from
its duty as a communication and guard vessel for the 2011 Cape to Rio yacht race
to the Gulf of Guinea to render “possible assistance to SA diplomats, designated
personnel and other South African citizens in Ivory Coast.”69 A special operations
force was also put ashore in Guinea. One might hope that similar situations in the
future, if political circumstances and SANDF capabilities are appropriate, will see
intervention by South African forces. (It is arguable that early intervention by an
African force in Côte d’Ivoire in early 2011 could have saved the lives of many of
the hundreds, if not thousands, who were killed in what is now being called the
Second Ivorian Civil War.) The noncombatant evacuation actually conducted by
the SANDF, the extraction of South African embassy personnel and other citizens
from Libya, could well also have involved maritime assets, Libya being a littoral
state. In the end, though, lack of appropriate capabilities forced the SANDF to
rely on goodwill from the Qadhafi regime (itself an embarrassment) and a chartered Boeing 767 to fulfill its mandate.
What is clearly missing from the SAN’s current capabilities is the ability to
offer strategic lift, firepower, and force protection for joint Spear forces. The ability to project significant force from the sea is in general of inestimable value for
deterrence, dissuasion, denial, disruption, and defeat of potential adversaries, and
to the SAN it would be of equal value as a means to contribute to African maritime security and deliver humanitarian and other support to neighbors and allies.
This fact is not lost on its leaders, and their plans for 2030 include, under Project
MILLENNIUM, the addition of three “strategic sealift and sustainment (SSS) vessels” within a planned fleet of twenty-two warships and submarines.70 No official
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details have yet been given as to the nature of these proposed SSS ships. If, as has
been suggested by some, the vessels are to be like the twenty-seven-thousandmetric-ton Canberra-class amphibious assault ships (LHDs) being built for the
Royal Australian Navy by Navantia, or the similar but smaller French Mistralclass LHDs, the idea of adding three of them is probably overreaching somewhat,
given their cost (though perhaps the idea is to ask for three in hope of securing
one or two). Smaller vessels, perhaps even in the range of the 1,500-metric-ton
Spearhead-class Joint High Speed Vessel, are more likely to be affordable and may
even be of greater utility for the kinds of Spear operations the SANDF might realistically conduct, and are more likely to contribute significantly in a secondary
Shield function.71 Whatever vessel, or mix of vessels, is chosen, there can be no
doubt that adding a capability to project force from the sea, even on a relatively
limited basis, would radically shift and enhance the utility of the South African
Navy’s force structure in a way appropriate to the nation’s position as a regional
power. To add this capability will, however, require a significant rethinking of approach and resource allocation within the South African National Defence Force
and the government.
CLEARER POLICY AND MORE FOCUSED ENGAGEMENT
African maritime security forces are currently misaligned to meet the security threats
they face. They have navy bureaucratic affiliations and training programs but have
a predominance of coast guard missions, operate in coast guard zones, and require
coast guard partnerships. . . . Accordingly, they are not efficiently organized and
trained to meet their challenges. They are also hampered by their dependence upon
the poorly matched foreign equipment they purchase or are given. Inefficiency and
small budgets reinforce each other, allowing maritime security challenges to remain
substantially unchecked. Billions of dollars of fish are stolen every year from a continent facing some of the world’s highest levels of malnutrition. International drug
syndicates are gaining a foothold among what are already some of the world’s most
fragile states.72

This statement is as true of South Africa in particular as it is of African nations
in general. Given the additional need for South Africa, as a regional power, to
be able to project force where necessary within its sphere of influence, it is clear
that the SAN of today is inadequate to the task of carrying out South Africa’s
maritime security mandate. There is, however, currently a window of opportunity by which just such a significant change could come about. On 20 April 2010
President Zuma appointed members to a newly devised national planning structure, the National Planning Commission (NPC), which is to “produce reports
on a range of issues that impact on our long term development, such as water
security, climate change, food security, energy security, infrastructure planning,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss2/9
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human resource development, defence and security matters, the structure of the
economy, spatial planning, demographic trends and so forth.”73
It is at least conceivable that the influence of the NPC could lead to the reshaping of the SANDF, and South Africa’s national security forces in general, into
structures that are equipped, trained, and employed in ways calibrated to the
actual needs of the nation. It is very much in the interests of the United States
and other members of the international community having an interest in Africa’s
maritime security, and in African security more generally, to assist the NPC and
the South African government in developing an appropriate national security
strategy and matching structures.
What can the United States, and other members of the international community, do? Vogel suggests a useful first step when he writes that
for Africa, a series of threat assessments would be highly beneficial, as no one really
knows what is going on in African waters. Many of the statistics frequently advanced
on drug traffic, illegal fishing, illicit commerce, and other prohibited activities are at
best educated guesses. It is also not known how much activity is occurring relatively
close to shore (within territorial waters) or over the horizon in EEZs. A comprehensive survey using satellite imagery to quantify ship traffic would be a good place to
start.74

At a more general level, more purposeful engagement with the SANDF and
the South African government could help to bring about constructive change.
Regular exchanges with the U.S. Coast Guard would be of benefit in reshaping
the philosophy and operational approach of the SAN, more than is, for example,
the hosting of SAN personnel at U.S. Navy “schoolhouses.” Diplomatic assistance
in such projects as collaborative southern African production for the navies of
the region of inshore patrol vessels (craft that the SAN greatly covets, to ensure
the viability of Project BIRO) could also be of great benefit. Other opportunities
would emerge, given clearer policy and more focused engagement. Clearly it is
in the long-term interests of the United States and allied nations to expend the
resources necessary to ensure that this happens.
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